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Abstract—Occupancy detection of a building has a wide range
of applications. Areas such as emergency management, home
automation and building energy management can benefit from
the knowledge of occupants’ locations to provide better results
and improve their efficiency. Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) bea-
cons installed inside a building are able to provide information
on an occupant’s location. Since, however, their operation is
based on broadcasting advertisements, they are vulnerable to
network security breaches. In this work, we evaluate the effect
of two types of spoofing attacks on a BLE based occupancy
detection system. The system is composed of BLE beacons
installed inside the building, a mobile application installed
on occupants mobile phones and a remote control server.
Occupancy detection is performed by a classifier installed
on the remote server. We use our real-world experimental
results to evaluate the impact of these attacks on the system’s
operation, particularly in terms of the accuracy with which it
can provide location information.
1. Introduction
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) beacons, which combine
low cost, low power requirements and compatibility with
the majority of smart phones, have been adopted by nu-
merous solutions geared towards smart environments. Ed-
ucation [1], healthcare [2], tourism [3], transportation [4]
and smart building sectors are only few of the examples
where this technology has been applied. Especially in a
building context, the knowledge of locations is beneficial
for emergency management [5], [6], [7] and building energy
management [8]. The beacons, however, base their operation
on the broadcast of advertisement packets which results in
security vulnerabilities. This work investigates the effect that
a specific type of threat (spoofing) has on the operation of a
BLE based occupancy detection system. The security provi-
sions of the Bluetooth protocol specification and Bluetooth
based communication system implementations have been
studied extensively [9]. There are also several examples of
novel attacks [10] and applications of known ones, such as
man-in-the-middle [11] proposed for its different versions,
each with varying degree of practicality and effectiveness.
In particular for BLE, the focus of most security research
is on the development of authentication or message au-
thorisation mechanisms, e.g. based on one-time passwords
[12]. What is typically overlooked in the literature is that
BLE, beyond being a communication protocol, is also an
enabler of high-accuracy indoor localisation. As a result,
there is little work in terms of analysis as to how different
security attacks affect this aspect of the application of BLE
and more specifically its ability to provide accurate indoor
localisation. The security challenges in using BLE for indoor
localisation have been investigated in [13]. The authors have
demonstrated a packet injection attack using a malicious
BLE beacon placed inside an office area. The evaluation of
the impact is limited to a location heatmap illustrating a
change in the distributions of occupants inside the area. In
[14], the authors have implemented a BLE beacon prototype
that adds a secure signature to the advertisement packet.
They evaluated their solution in a tram maintenance shed to
provide navigation instructions in a public transport context.
Their evaluation, however, does not include an investigation
of potential attacks against the proposed system. Finally,
the security vulnerabilities of indoor positioning systems
based on Wi-Fi and BLE technology are studied in [15],
but without addressing how a network attack would affect
the system’s operation.
Here, we address this gap in the landscape of BLE
security research by evaluating the impact of two different
spoofing attacks on a BLE based indoor occupancy detection
system [16], [17]. The first attack assumes a basic adversary
with physical access, while the second assumes an advanced
adversary who can remotely reconfigure a beacon.
2. Description of the System
In this section, we provide the details of our system
design, including an overview of the architecture and a
description of the individual system components.
2.1. Overall Architecture
The primary concept of our approach is based on the use
of BLE beacons that have been installed inside a building.
The beacons communicate with a back-end server via a
mobile application running on a smartphone, allowing our
Figure 1. System Architecture
system to infer a user’s location inside the building, as
illustrated in Figure 1. The use of BLE beacons has been
adopted in commercial deployments in order to provide
micro-localisation services. The beacons operate in a non-
connectible mode and only transmit BLE advertising data
packets which contain information such as the beacons’
identity, as shown in Figure 3. A mobile phone in the vicin-
ity of the beacons receives the data packets and stores their
received signal strength indicator (RSSI) values along with
the beacon identities using a mobile application. Finally, the
mobile application sends all the collected beacon data to the
remote server where a trained classifier processes the data
to derive the user’s location. Additionally, in our approach:
• There is no assumed knowledge of the location of
the beacons inside the building
• The smartphone does not process the received BLE
advertising packets to calculate the user’s location
• The server does not send location information back
to the mobile device.
As the system does not perform any localisation process-
ing on the mobile device, the computational and memory
requirements of the mobile device are significantly reduced.
It is the server’s responsibility to process the raw beacon
identity and RSSI information to calculate a building’s
occupancy. This is achieved via an initial data gathering
phase which is used to train a classifier running on the
server. Section 3.2 elaborates on the data gathering phase
and data processing. Also, processing the raw data on the
server allows for the use of more computationally expensive
classification algorithms.
2.2. BLE Beacons
Our beacons are based on a Raspberry Pi 2 Model B with
an attached Bluetooth 4 LE module via a USB interface. The
BlueZ package is used to emulate beacons on the Raspberry
Pis and customise the BLE advertising data. The beacons are
purely transmitters and broadcast BLE advertising packets.
Figure 2 shows one of our Raspberry Pi based prototype
BLE beacons.
To identify each beacon individually, we make use of
the three different IDs (UUID, Major & Minor) available
within the beacon packet structure, as shown in Figure 3.
Using these different identifies, we create a small hierarchy
where, the Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) is used
to define a universal group. Hence, all beacons used in
our experiments have the same UUID, allowing them to be
separated from other unassociated Bluetooth devices. Then,
Figure 2. Our Raspberry Pi based Beacon
Figure 3. BLE beacon Advertising Packet Data Structure
the major number is used to define the local groups of
beacons. For example, beacons belonging to certain floors
within a building will share the same major number. Lastly,
the minor number is used to define each individual beacon
within its local group.
2.3. Mobile Application
We have developed an Android mobile application using
Android version 6 (Marshmallow) that has two modes of
operation: data gathering mode and normal mode. In data
gathering mode, the application would be used by a trained
operator to collect and label the incoming data from beacons
to train a machine learning classification algorithm running
on the remote control server. In this mode, the application
does not connect to the remote control server. In normal
mode, however, the application is used by a client of the
system, which is collecting the data from installed beacons
and reporting to the remote control server, where a trained
classification algorithm determines occupancy.
In data gathering mode, the application detects all BLE
traffic in range, filtering out our beacon advertising packets
and stores information related to that individual beacon,
along with RSSI data for each BLE packet received. To
filter out other unwanted Bluetooth traffic, the application
first attempts to identify the UUID of our beacons within
the received payload. If the UUID is found then, extract the
other identifies with the RSSI and store the beacon, else
reject the packet. In this mode, the operator simply needs
to set what sector they are in and specify the amount of the
time they wish to collect data for, as illustrated by Figure
4. Once data gathering has been started, the operator only
needs to move around in the specified sector, as the rest of
the data gathering process is automated. Additionally, the
application creates a set of data logs when in data gathering
mode, which can then be used to generate machine learning
examples to train a classifier, as can be seen in Section 3.2.
When the mobile application is in normal operation,
again the application will detect all BLE traffic it is in range
of, storing our beacon packets and filtering out any unwanted
Bluetooth packets. Also in this mode, once the application
has collected an adequate amount of beacon advertising
Figure 4. UI of the Mobile Application in Data Gathering Mode
packets and corresponding RSSI data over a short period,
such as the window size used for the classifier, it will send
this raw data to the back-end server for processing. This
approach of only periodically sending data to the server
reduces the traffic over the wireless or mobile network
interfaces and results in lower energy consumption.
2.4. Server
The role of the server is to process the beacon identities
and corresponding RSSI data sent from mobile devices,
and then estimate the building’s occupancy. Initially the
classifiers that run on the server need to be trained using
the data gathered during the data gathering phase. In normal
operation mode, the server uses the trained classifiers to
update building occupancy estimation based on the data
coming from the mobile devices.
2.5. Description of the BLE Spoofing Attacks
We have produced two BLE attack scenarios, one con-
sidering a basic and one considering an advanced attacker
model. Both involve spoofing the Universally Unique Iden-
tifiers (UUIDs) of the beacons.
2.5.1. Basic Attacker Model - Evil Twin Attack. Here,
the assumption is that the attacker has physical access to the
area of deployment of the BLE beacons and has sniffed their
UUIDs. The attacker then adds a beacon in a new location
mimicking one of the existing beacons by transmitting with
its UUID.
2.5.2. Advanced Attacker Model - Beacon Swap Attack.
This scenario assumes that the attacker has no physical
access, yet is able to remotely hijack beacons and change
their configurations. This can be emulated by swapping
the identities of two existing beacons, while keeping their
locations unchanged.
3. Experimental Evaluation
This section elaborates on the experimental methodology
we adopted and the experimental results we produced. We
first give a description of the method we followed for our
experiments and we continue by presenting our classification
approach and related results.
3.1. Design and Methodology
We conducted our experiments inside a computer lab-
oratory of the University of Greenwich. The laboratory is
essentially an office space furnished with objects such as
desks, benches and chairs. We have used a virtual grid,
with each grid block representing a 1m x 1m space, to
map the experimental area and illustrate the different beacon
deployment patterns. The laboratory has been divided into
seven sectors. Sectors one to five are computer bays while
sectors six and seven represent an open corridor through the
centre of the laboratory.
Three different deployment patterns were used. Firstly,
the ground truth (see Figure 5) deployment pattern was
used to collect the training data for the machine learning
classifier. Second, the evil twin (see Figure 6) deployment
pattern was used to emulate an attacker mimicking one
of the existing beacons, as discussed in Section 2.5.1. In
this deployment, beacon six has been duplicated. Lastly, the
swap (see Figure 7) deployment pattern was used to emulate
the scenario of an attacker remotely hijacking beacons and
changing their configuration, as discussed in Section 2.5.2.
In this deployment, the software of beacons B1 and B2 has
been modified to transmit the swapped identities.
For the data gathering phase, we used the mobile ap-
plication while randomly walking within the boundaries
of each sector for all three different deployment patterns.
When gathering the data, we used the mobile application to
label the incoming BLE advertising packets with the current
sector. Moreover, for each received BLE packet, we ensured
that the source of the packet was one of our BLE beacons
by checking the UUID. Then, we logged the respective
identifiers and RSSI with the assigned sector label. The
beacons’ transmission frequency was set at 7 Hz thought-
out the experiment. Additionally, we used a timer within the
mobile application to only log incoming BLE advertising
packets for 210 seconds for each sector.
3.2. Classification Based Occupancy Detection
Using our data set from the ground truth deployment
(see Figure 5) to train a Logistic Regression (LR) classi-
fier. We have chosen to use a LR classifier as it a fairly
Figure 5. Beacon Deployment Ground Truth
Figure 6. Beacon Deployment Evil Twin
Figure 7. Beacon Deployment Swap
computationally inexpensive classification algorithm with
a reasonable level of accuracy. As previously mentioned
in Section 3.1, our raw data set contains the individual
BLE advertising packets from specific beacons, with beacon
identifiers, respective RSSI value and a sector label. To
create the data points for training the LR classifier, we used
a windowing approach and for each beacon we calculated
the mean and standard deviation of its RSSI values within
the window. This resulted in 14 features for each data point.
We used three different window sizes (1s, 2s and 3s) with
no overlap. As the size of the windows increases, the more
raw BLE packets are used within the window and hence,
lower amount of data points produced.
When training the LR classifier, the data sets were
randomised and then partitioned into a 80% training set and
a 20% testing set. 10-fold cross-validation was used to select
a suitable λ regularisation parameter for the LR classifier
for the three different window sizes. After performing 10-
fold cross-validation, 0.3 was found to be the most suitable
for the λ regularisation parameter for all window sizes.
Moreover, as we use different window sizes, this results in
our data sets sizes varying. More specifically, the training
data set sizes was 1171, 583 and 387 data points for window
sizes of 1s, 2s and 3s respectively. When testing the LR
classifier, the unseen 20% test set was used to measure
the performance of the LR classifier under normal system
operation. This was the basis for our ground truth results,
as shown in Section 3.2.1. The trained classifier was then
tested with the evil twin and swap data sets.This informed
our evil twin and swap results, as discussed in Sections 3.2.2
and 3.2.3 respectively. The test data set sizes were 1463,
728 and 483 data points for window sizes of 1s, 2s and 3s
respectively for both evil twin and swap scenarios.
For evaluating the performance of the LR classifier, the
metric used was its accuracy, which is defined as
Accuracy =
Number of Correct Predictions
Total Number of Predictions
However, accuracy generally does not optimally define the
performance of the LR classifier, since it is negatively
affected by class imbalance. Although our data gathering
methodology inherently minimises class imbalance, as we
spent an equal amount of time in each of the sectors, we
decided to use a confusion matrix to better describe the
performance for the normal operation and attack scenarios.
In our confusion matrix, each row represents the in-
stances in an actual class, while each column represents
the instance in an predicted class. The elements along
the diagonal represent the number of instances when the
predicted sector label is the same as the actual sector label.
Whereas, the off-diagonal elements represent the number
of instances that are misclassified. The confusion matrices
have been normalised by the number of elements in each
class. Additionally, we have colour coded the elements of
the matrices by assigning white to 0.0 (0%) and black to
1.0 (100%), to improve the visualisation of the data.
3.2.1. Ground Truth Results. Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the
experimental results belonging to the ground truth beacon
deployment (see Figure 5), for the different window size
values. These results show how our LR classification algo-
rithm is performing when the system is in normal operation.
By inspecting the confusion matrices we observe that the
accuracy of the classification does generally improve as the
window size increases, with a widow size of 3s performing
the best overall. As discussed in Section 3.2, as the size
of window increases in time, the more RSSI values are
averaged in the window. However, increasing the window
size results in less data points being available to train the
classifier which can affect the performance of the system.
We can observe that the two corridor sectors (S6 & S7)
are being misclassified over the different window sizes,
especially in instance of S7 with values ranging from 44%
to 76%. This can be explained by looking at the floor plan in
Figure 5. As we can see, sectors S1 to S5 are each primarily
associated one beacon that isn’t associated with any other
sector (B1 with S1, B2 with S2, B5 with S3, B6 with S4
and B7 with S5). Whereas, sectors S6 and S7 are between
multiple beacons and not have a single beacon primarily
associated with them. Moreover, Logistic Regression is a
linear classifier and therefore, when the data isn’t linearly
separable, the predictions are less accurate.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
S1 0.78 0.02 0.02 0 0 0.05 0.13
S2 0.02 0.75 0.02 0 0.02 0.06 0.13
S3 0 0 0.86 0.02 0 0.06 0.06
S4 0.02 0 0.02 0.83 0.02 0.05 0.06
S5 0 0 0 0 0.95 0.05 0
S6 0.02 0 0.02 0 0.23 0.68 0.05
S7 0.13 0.08 0.17 0.08 0 0.1 0.44
TABLE 1. EXP = GROUND TRUTH, WINDOW = 1S
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
S1 0.9 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.05
S2 0 0.95 0 0 0 0 0.05
S3 0 0 0.76 0 0 0.04 0.2
S4 0 0 0 0.95 0 0 0.05
S5 0 0 0 0 0.82 0.18 0
S6 0.05 0 0 0 0 0.77 0.18
S7 0.23 0.09 0.09 0.04 0 0 0.55
TABLE 2. EXP = GROUND TRUTH, WINDOW = 2S
3.2.2. Evil Twin Attack Results. Tables 4, 5 and 6 il-
lustrate the experimental results belonging to the evil twin
beacon deployment (see Figure 6), for the different window
size values. We can clearly note that there is an overall
deterioration in the classification results. More specifically,
the sectors that are mostly affected are the ones near the
location of the evil twin beacon. For example, for the case
of a window of 3s the classification accuracy for Sector 2
(which is close to the evil twin) drops from 100% to 75%.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
S1 0.93 0 0 0 0 0 0.07
S2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
S3 0 0 0.74 0 0 0 0.26
S4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
S5 0 0 0 0 0.93 0.07 0
S6 0 0 0 0 0 0.92 0.08
S7 0 0 0.08 0.08 0 0.08 0.76
TABLE 3. EXP = GROUND TRUTH, WINDOW = 3S
This is not, however, the case for Sector 5 (which is the
area furthest away from the location of the evil twin) as the
reduction to its classification accuracy is far less (drops from
93% to 86%). A potential application of this attack scenario
could be the disruption of an indoor localisation system by
an opponent who has sniffed the identities of the beacons
and has physical access to the deployment area. As the
experimental results indicate, the impact of the disruption
can be spatially contained, depending on where the location
of the evil twin beacon.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
S1 0.8 0.02 0.01 0 0 0.02 0.15
S2 0.07 0.69 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.13
S3 0 0 0.55 0.43 0 0 0.02
S4 0.02 0 0.04 0.82 0.03 0.03 0.06
S5 0.02 0.01 0 0.01 0.83 0.11 0.02
S6 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.23 0.34 0.21
S7 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.43 0 0.04 0.37
TABLE 4. EXP = EVIL TWIN, WINDOW = 1S
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
S1 0.88 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.1
S2 0.04 0.76 0 0.01 0.01 0 0.18
S3 0 0 0.62 0.32 0 0 0.06
S4 0.03 0 0.01 0.84 0.03 0.02 0.07
S5 0.02 0 0 0 0.89 0.09 0
S6 0.11 0 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.48 0.15
S7 0.1 0.02 0 0.3 0 0.01 0.57
TABLE 5. EXP = EVIL TWIN, WINDOW = 2S
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
S1 0.9 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.09
S2 0.04 0.75 0 0.03 0 0 0.18
S3 0 0 0.59 0.38 0 0 0.03
S4 0.02 0 0 0.9 0 0.04 0.04
S5 0 0 0 0 0.86 0.14 0
S6 0.09 0 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.58 0.19
S7 0.15 0.03 0 0.3 0 0.01 0.51
TABLE 6. EXP = EVIL TWIN, WINDOW = 3S
3.2.3. Beacon Swap Attack Results. Tables 7, 8 and 9
show the experimental results belonging to the swap beacon
deployment (see Figure 7), for the different window size
values. Similarly to the evil twin case, we can observe
a decrease in the overall classification accuracy. We must
note, however, an interesting effect on the sectors for which
the beacons have been swapped. For all window values,
the classifier consistently misclassifies sector 1 for sector
2 and vice versa. In particular, the normalised values of
missclassified data points exceeds 60% and in some cases
approaches 80% (e.g. sector 2 in Tables 8 and 9. If we
interpret this result in terms of the classifier’s performance,
it is evident that the deterioration is far worse than that
of the evil twin case. However, in this case we observe a
targeted manipulation of the classification results: occupants
that are located in sector 1 will be confidently reported
by the system as being in sector 2 and vice versa. This
attack approach could be adopted in order to manipulate an
indoor occupancy system and alter the information provided
to the users. For example, in the case of a terrorist attack
the opponent can implement a beacon swap to mislead
the emergency responders and disrupt the rescue operation.
Similarly to the evil twin scenario, the opponent has to sniff
the identities of the beacons. However, he also has to gain
access to the beacons’ software to alter the information they
transmit.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
S1 0.17 0.58 0 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.16
S2 0.73 0.12 0.01 0.01 0 0.11 0.02
S3 0.02 0 0.68 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.08
S4 0 0.01 0.01 0.85 0.01 0.06 0.06
S5 0.02 0 0 0.01 0.84 0.13 0
S6 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.22 0.48 0.14
S7 0.16 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.23 0.42
TABLE 7. EXP = SWAP, WINDOW = 1S
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
S1 0.12 0.66 0 0 0.01 0.09 0.12
S2 0.77 0.08 0.01 0 0 0.13 0.01
S3 0.02 0 0.8 0.05 0 0.05 0.08
S4 0 0 0 0.86 0.03 0.06 0.05
S5 0.02 0 0 0 0.8 0.18 0
S6 0.11 0 0.01 0.03 0.14 0.61 0.1
S7 0.1 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.25 0.48
TABLE 8. EXP = SWAP, WINDOW = 2S
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
S1 0.1 0.67 0 0 0 0.06 0.17
S2 0.78 0.1 0 0 0 0.12 0
S3 0 0 0.8 0.06 0 0.04 0.1
S4 0 0 0 0.93 0.01 0.03 0.03
S5 0.03 0 0 0 0.8 0.17 0
S6 0.1 0 0 0.03 0.12 0.64 0.11
S7 0.15 0 0.03 0.04 0 0.23 0.55
TABLE 9. EXP = SWAP, WINDOW = 3S
4. Conclusions and Future Work
We have evaluated the effect of two attack scenarios
against an occupancy detection system based on BLE bea-
cons. The attack scenarios address a basic opponent with
physical access to the area and an advanced opponent who
is able to remotely access the software of the deployed
beacons and modify the information they transmit. Our real
world experiments indicate that although both attacks result
in a deterioration of our system’s performance in terms of
classification accuracy, the beacon swap scenario can alter
the system’s operation in a more sophisticated manner to
manipulate the information provided to the users.
Looking at areas of future work, we will investigate
approaches that can help us detect these types of attacks
as well as well as response mechanisms that will improve
the performance of our system. We will also extend the
range of machine learning algorithms that we use, to inves-
tigate the effect of malicious spoofing attacks on different
classification approaches.
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